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Administrative Arbitrariness
Is Not Always Reviewable
Kenneth Culp Davis*
Mr. Berger's main thesis in his four articles is that the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act1 makes administrative arbitrariness
or abuse of discretion always judicially reviewable. At many
points throughout his four articles on this subject he expresses
or implies the always.2 He says, for instance, that his demon-
stration should lead judges "to conclude that arbitrariness was
meant to be and should be reviewable across the board."3  He
refers to "the section 10(e) provision that arbitrariness would
always be reviewable. . . ."4 His main purpose is to attack the
position I have taken in section 28.16 of my Treatise that ad-
ministrative discretion is sometimes reviewable for arbitrariness
or abuse and is sometimes not.
My opinion continues to be that under the APA adminis-
trative arbitrariness or abuse is sometimes unreviewable. Solely
on the basis of the Act and its legislative history, before any
case had interpreted the Act on the question, I took that posi-
tion in a 1948 article.5 Now that the abundant case law uni-
formly so holds,6 I think I can be extremely cautious and still
say that the law is entirely clear.
Mr. Berger's main position is, in his words, that "the second
exception of section 10 [of the APA] does not curtail the section
10 (e) directive to set aside 'abuse of discretion.' M7 The Supreme
Court unanimously says precisely the opposite, as I think it
should. The second exception is "Except so far as . . . agency
action is by law committed to agency discretion. . . ." The Su-
preme Court has declared: "Section 10 of the Administrative
Procedure Act ... excludes from the categories of cases subject
to judicial review 'agency action' that is 'by law committed to
agency discretion.' ",
Not a single case has adopted the Berger interpretation of
the APA. The courts have uniformly adopted the opposite in-
terpretation. And the case law is so abundant that at least eight
cases on the question were decided during the single year 1966.9
Lacking decisions to support his view, Berger resorts to the
interesting argument that the law is not what the uniform case
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law holds it to be: "Properly construed, the statute, not Davis'
few mistaken judicial followers, represents what the law is."' 0
But he has never mentioned the APA's main provision on
reviewability, which says the opposite of what he says: "Ex-
cept so far as (1) statutes preclude judicial review or (2) agency
action is by law committed to agency discretion (c) . . . every
final agency action ... shall be subject to judicial review.""
Another conclusive consideration, of which Berger shows
no awareness, is that the 1966 codification of the APA says that
the judicial review provisions of the APA do not apply to "agency
action ... committed to agency discretion by law.' 2 This means
that Berger's main position that the APA makes such action re-
viewable becomes an unseemly posture of lying flat on his back
with all four wheels spinning. The APA can have no effect on
something to which it does not apply. The codifiers have taken
my view. Even if Berger writes four more articles that the codi-
fiers are wrong, their view is the law because Congress has en-
acted it.
The Berger interpretation of the APA has nothing against
it except the clear statutory words, the unanimous Supreme
Court, the unanimous lower courts, and now the unanimous
Congress in the codification! Perhaps nothing more need be
said, but I think other Berger misunderstandings need correction.
The most extreme of all Berger positions is that the Consti-
tution requires review of arbitrariness.13 No case supports him.
Throughout our history, the Supreme Court has held some ad-
miristrative action unreviewable for arbitrariness or abuse. In
thefoundation case in 1827, the Court refused to review a finding
of fact and declared: "It is no answer that such a power may be
abused, for there is no power which is not susceptible of abuse."' 4
In 1900 the Supreme. Court denied review to a federal employee
who was allegedly discharged "without just cause." The Court
said the discretionary action was "beyond review in the courts
... ,"'s In 1919 the Supreme Court held administrative action
unreviewable because "a mere excess or abuse of discretion in
exerting a power given . ." was " . . . beyond the reach of ju-
dicial power."' 6 The Supreme Court in 1943 held a certification
of a union unreviewable, because the issue was deemed "explo-
sive" and the Court found that Congress did not intend "to
implicate the federal judiciary . ,"1 Chapter 28 of my Trea-
tise reviews perhaps -thirty Supreme Court decisions denying
review to particular administrative action.1
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Perhaps the most important single case against Berger's view
that arbitrariness is always reviewable and that the Constitution
requires reviewability is a 1965 holding of the Supreme Court.
The Board denied a petition for "an opportunity to vote for or
against representatives." The complaint alleged that the denial
was "arbitrary, capricious and discriminatory" and also alleged
that "the form of the ballot ... is arbitrary, capricious and dis-
criminatory."'19 The district court dismissed the case and a di-
vided court of appeals affirmed, holding that the APA required
review, but the Supreme Court reversed. The Supreme Court
held that the Board's "decision on the matter is not subject to
judicial review where there is no showing that it has acted in
excess of its statutory authority," and that "the Board's choice
of its proposed ballot is not subject to judicial review, for it was
to avoid the haggling and delays of litigation that such questions
were left to the Board. 2°
Indeed, the Supreme Court is sometimes at the other end of
the spectrum from Berger's extreme idea that the Constitution
requires review of arbitrariness. Even when a statute unequiv-
ocally required review, the Supreme Court has unanimously de-
nied review, without mentioning the possibility that cutting off
review might raise a constitutional question. The Court said
that "the very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy
is political, not judicial. Such decisions are . . .of a kind for
which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor respon-
sibility and which has long been held to belong in the domain of
political power and not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry."'21
Contrast Berger's assertion: "In no corner of American life can
it be assumed that protection against official oppression is 'in-
trinsically unsuitable.' " 22
The reasons that have impelled both Congress and the courts
to make some administrative arbitrariness or abuse of discre-
tion unreviewable are powerful. Section 2 (a) of the APA makes
the president an "agency "'23 Since section 10 on judicial review
does not except foreign affairs or military matters, adoption of
Mr. Berger's thesis would mean that courts would review for
arbitrariness or abuse of discretion the President's activities in
seeking peace in Vietnam, the President's military orders about
Vietnam,24 decisions about slowing down donations of grain to
India, all decisions about foreign aid, the President's denial of a
pardon,2 5 and the President's recognition or refusal of recogni-
tion of a foreign government.26
1967]
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Congress often cuts off review entirely, including review of
arbitrariness. For instance, a statute makes certain decisions on
veterans' claims "final and conclusive and no. . . court. . . shall
have power or jurisdiction to review .... -27 If discretion is
arbitrary, it still cannot be reviewed.28 There are many such
statutes, including the Renegotiation Act under which issues
involving many billions of dollars have been resolved.29 No such
statute has ever been held unconstitutional for cutting off re-
view.30
Mr. Berger presents an impressive collection of Supreme
Court statements that our Constitution and our institutions leave
no place for arbitrary exercise of power.31 I agree with those
statements; I do not see how anyone could disagree with them.
But they do not prove that arbitrary exercise of power is always
reviewable. One of Mr. Berger's pervasive mistakes is to equate
lack of authority to act arbitrarily with judicial reviewability.
A lieutenant in Vietnam surely lacks authority to pick on the
same private for every dangerous assignment, but that does not
mean that a court will or should review.
In many respects my position differs drastically from the
picture of it that Mr. Berger paints. He is mistaken in giving
the impression that I favor unreviewability. In section 28.21 of
my Treatise I have argued for enlarging the area of reviewabil-
ity; in 1954 I initiated the idea of a presumption of reviewabil-
ity. 32 As to what the law should be, my position is a middle
one between the courts and Mr. Berger. He is mistaken in re-
peatedly implying that any holding that the APA requires re-
view of discretion is contrary to my view; I have consistently
said that under the APA some discretion is reviewable and some
is not, and the affirmative part of that is as important as the
negative part.33 Berger is also mistaken in his many arguments
that I have changed my position; the whole structure of his
arguments is based on a dozen or more clear-cut misquotations,
which he has refused to correct after I have called them to his
attention.34
Berger seems to me plainly mistaken in asserting that Pro-
fessor Jaffe's view is not directly opposed to his. The Berger
view is that arbitrariness is always reviewable. Jaffe asserts
that "there are statutory discretions which are not subject to
* . . review. . .", and this is directly opposed to Berger, because
Jaffe means not subject to review for arbitrariness or for other
reasons.86 Another Jaffe statement directly opposed to Berger's
is this: "[E]ven without explicit exclusion of review, the char-
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acter of the granted power or the terms in which it is granted
may imply exclusion. "3 7  The idea that "the character of the
granted power" may exclude review is precisely what Berger is
fighting against. Jaffe italicizes his conclusion: "Presumptive-
ly, an exercise of discretion is reviewable for . . . 'abuse."'38 I
agree. A presumption of reviewability is altogether different
from Berger's position that abuse is always reviewable.39
Although I have pinpointed each of Berger's many misun-
derstandings in full detail in memoranda supplied to him (a copy
of which I shall be glad to send to any reader who has reason to
make a full analysis), my opinion is that most of his misunder-
standings do not merit discussion in a law review. I shall ac-
cordingly limit myself to two selected ones in a footnote,40 and
I shall devote the next two paragraphs to two major ones.
The cornerstone of his argument about interpreting the
APA is his proposition, repeatedly asserted, that "'discretion'
and 'abuse of discretion' are opposites."4' My opinion is that of
the three categories-(1) exercise of discretion, (2) proper exer-
cise of discretion, and (3) abuse of discretion-the second and
third are opposites but the first and third are not. Berger's view
that the first and third are opposites is something like saying
that animals and male animals are opposites.
Although Mr. Berger's main position is that (1) the courts
should always review abuse of discretion or arbitrariness, he
couples that with the idea that (2) discretion should often "re-
main unreviewable."4 2 These two propositions, in my opinion,
cannot possibly be adopted either by Congress or by the courts,
because whenever a party falsely alleges abuse of discretion, the
court cannot escape violation of either the first proposition or
the second. If it does not inquire whether discretion has been
abused, it violates the first, and if it does so inquire, it reviews
the exercise of discretion, thus violating the second. Mr. Ber-





1. Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5
U.S.C.A. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (Special Pamphlet 1966). The APA is here-
inafter cited with only original section numbers, except in note 12,
which explains the 1966 codification.
2. He says he differs with my view that "in some areas arbitrary
action must be and is unreviewable." Berger, Administrative Arbitrari-
ness-A Reply to Professor Davis, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 783, 784 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Berger, Reply]. He says without qualification that
"APA section 10 (e) directs that courts '.hall . .. set aside agency ac-
tion ... found to be (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion
.... "' Id. at 785. In making this statement he makes no mention of
the qualifying words in the APA: "Except so far as ... agency action
is by law committed to agency discretion." APA § 10. He protests in
his article against what he calls "the Davis proposal selectively to shield
arbitrary action from review." Ibid. He says: "There is no shred of evi-
dence that Congress intended to create a system of selective review of
arbitrariness." Id. at 811. He says in his article: "The categorical,
unqualified section 10(e) directive to set aside arbitrariness leaves no
room for selective unreviewability." Berger, Administrative Arbitrari-
ness: A Sequel, 51 MmN. L. REv. 601, 611 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Berger, Sequel]. He makes perhaps a dozen or more other similar
statements.
3. Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness-A Rejoinder to Professor
Davis' "Final Word", 114 U. PA. L. Rnv. 816, 822 (1966).
4. Berger, Sequel 619.
5. Davis, Nonreviewable Administrative Action, 96 U. PA. L. REv.
749 (1948). Two paragraphs at 775-76 are now the first two paragraphs
of § 28.16 of my Treatise, and these are the primary target of Mr. Berger's
attack.
6. I do not mean to imply that every court has adopted my analy-
sis. Many have explicitly done so, but many have reached the same
result without mention of my analysis. Berger three times asserts that
'the courts have taken my analysis "on faith." Berger, Sequel 625; Berger,
Reply 786, 804. Possibly some have, but my surmise is that reasons have
been more influential than "faith."
7. Berger, Sequel 635.
8. Panama Canal Co. v. Grace Lines, Inc., 356 U.S. 309, 317 (1958).
9. The recent case law is summarized in § 28.16 of the 1965 pocket
parts to my Treatise. In this note I shall mention some 1966 cases. The
Fifth Circuit holds that discretionary action by the Rural Electrification
Administration in making loans is unreviewable for abuse: "Regard-
less of how outrageous or unfair the making of this loan may seem, the
remedy is not in the courts but in Congress." Rural Electrification Ad-
ministration v. Central Louisiana Elec. Co., 354 F.2d 859, 865 (5th Cir.
1966). The Third Circuit refuses review of administrative reduction of
a lawyer's fee from $5,000 to $250, saying that "even if we were to
assume ... it was arbitrary and capricious and constituted an abuse of
discretion, his order is nonetheless not reviewable." Chernock v. Gard-
ner, 360 F.2d 257, 259 (3d Cir. 1966). The Second Circuit holds that
discretionary refusal by the General Counsel and the NLRB to issue
complaints is not reviewable; I am not sure that I would so hold, but I
am sure that the APA does not prevent such a holding. United Elec.
Contractors Ass'n v. Ordman, 366 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1966). A district
court holds, on the basis of a line of cases to the same effect, that re-




substantive errors. Cohen v. Ryder, 258 F. Supp. 693 (E.D. Pa. -1966),
and cases cited. Discretion of the Small Business Administration in
granting or denying loans is not reviewable. The court's general-
ization about the APA is precisely the opposite of Berger's position:
"The Courts have consistently given effect to the provision excepting
... 'agency action that is by law committed to agency discretion.'"
vonLusch v. Hoffmaster, 253 F. Supp. 633, 635 (D.C. Md. 1966). A court
held it lacked jurisdiction to review a discretionary denial of federal
funds for a college; the court disposed of an argument based on the
APA by saying simply that it provides for judicial review except so far
as statutes preclude review or action is committed to agency discretion.
Paducah Junior College v. Secretary, 255 F. Supp. 147 (W.D. Ky. 1966).
A court held it was without authority to review denial of remission of
an automobile. Jary Leasing Corp. v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 157
(E.D.N.Y. 1966). An example of a case that adopts my view as to how
the APA should be interpreted and then goes on to hold that the action
is reviewable is Cappadora v. Celebrezze, 356 F.2d 1, 5-6 (2d Cir. 1966).
The court analyzed the APA and concluded: "The question thus is
whether the Act 'so far' commits decision to reopen to agency discre-
tion that a refusal would not be open to review even in case of abuse."
Id. at 5. That is precisely my position. The court goes on to hold that
administrative action in the case was not so far committed to agency
discretion. Not only do I agree with the result but I agree with all of
the court's analysis. The only slight doubt I have is about this passage
at page 5: ". . . § 10(e) of the APA expressly authorizes the courts to
set aside any administrative decision constituting an abuse of discretion."
If those words stood alone, I would disagree. -But they are immediately
followed by words which satisfy me:
The question is whether the Secretary in deciding not to reopen
enjoys absolute discretion-whether such a decision is totally
committed to the judgment of the agency because of the prac-
tical requirements of the task to be performed, absence of avail-
able standards against which to measure the administrative
action, or even the fact that no useful purpose could be served
by judicial review.
Id. at 5-6. The opinion is one of the best I have seen.
10. Berger, Sequel 625-26 & n.131.
11. APA § 10, 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1964). One error that pervades
Berger's four articles is his assumption that a discussion of the "except"
clause has no point except in combination with subsection (e) on scope
of review. For instance, in the latest article at 611-12, he quotei var-
ious statements of mine that the "except" clause is read literally and
says: ."If all this was without bearing on section 10 (e), if it was not
being employed by Davis in 'combination,' it was utterl pointless."
Berger, Sequel 612. Apparently the only combination he can see is the
combination of the "except" clause with subsection (e). But the "ex-
cept" clause combines with subsection (a) on standing, with (b) on
forms of action, with (c) on reviewability, with (d) 'on interim relief,
and with other parts of (e) besides the "abuse of discretion" phrase that
Berger focuses on. On the subject of reviewability, the key, combination
is with (c), because (c) deals with reviewability.
Berger says at page 612:
The crucial question, to which no reply has been made, is h6w
Professor Davis can, in good conscience, argue that a "liter'al"
reading of the "except" clause curtails across-the-board review-




declare that when the "except" clause is read in "combination"
with subsection 10 (e) it makes no sense.
The answer to this crucial question is easy. First, I have never said that
the combination of the "except" clause with 10 (e) makes no sense; what
I have said is that the combination of the "except" clause with the "abuse
of discretion" phrase of 10(e) makes no sense. Secondly, the literal
reading of the "except" clause is always used in any combination other
than with the "abuse of discretion" phrase. The literal reading is used
in combinations with (a), (b), (c), (d), and all parts of (e) except
the "abuse of discretion" phrase.
I know of no reason for rejecting a literal interpretation of the fol-
lowing combination of the "except" clause with a part of 10 (e): "Except
so far as. . . agency action is by law commited to agency discretion....
(e) . . . the reviewing court shall ... (B) . .. set aside agency action
* . . found to be (C) arbitrary .... $
See my analysis in the first two paragraphs of § 28.16 of my Treatise.
12. 80 Stat. 392 (1966), 5 U.S.C.A. § 701 (Special Pamphlet 1966),
effective Sept. 6, 1966: "This chapter [all the provisions on judicial
review] applies . . . except to the extent that-(1) statutes preclude
judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion
by law." Perhaps even Mr. Berger will now agree that since the judi-
cial review provisions do not apply to agency action which is committed
to agency discretion by law, the APA cannot make such action review-
able. As to what action is "committed to agency discretion," see § 28.16
of my Treatise. Of course, the theory of codification is that no substan-
tive change is made, and I agree with the codifiers that in this provision
they have made no substantive change.
13. He says, for instance, that "in my view, the right to be pro-
tected against arbitrariness is rooted in the Constitution . . . ." Berger,
Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Review, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 55,
57-58 (1965). In the present article he says at page 607 that the three
cases he discusses do not support my statement that the law is over-
whelming that unreviewability of arbitrariness is not necessarily uncon-
stitutional. My opinion is that he has misinterpreted each of the three
cases. The most important one is the Brotherhood case, which I discuss
infra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
14. Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 32 (1827).
15. Keim v. United States, 177 U.S. 290, 292, 294 (1900). The case
is still the foundation of the law concerning the removal of federal em-
ployees. See, e.g., Cohen v. Ryder, 258 F. Supp. 693 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
16. Dakota Cent. Tel. Co. v. South Dakota, 250 U.S. 163, 184 (1919).
Even when the abuse of discretion involved a finding of guilt and "the
subsequent investigation established his innocence," the Supreme Court
held: "It is settled that in such cases the action of executive officers is
not subject to revision in the courts." Eberlein v. United States, 257
U.S. 82, 84 (1921).
17. Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297, 303
(1943). Because of the broad base of the opinion, the case has generally
been interpreted to cut off review of arbitrariness; the Supreme Court
so interpreted it in Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Association, 380
U.S. 650 (1965).
18. Not all of the cases denying review raise issues of arbitrariness.
But many hold that administrative interpretation of a statute is not re-
viewable, and, in general, the courts are more reluctant to hold statu-




discretion unreviewable. This difference comes out often in judicial
opinions. For example, see the text at notes 19-20 infra.
19. Paragraphs X and XII of the Complaint, at pages 7 and 8 of
the printed Transcript of Record.
20. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Association, 380 U.S. 650,
669, 671 (1965). As for Berger's view that cutting off review would be
unconstitutional, the Court did not even mention that possibility. Nor
did any of the many excellent briefs.
21. Chicago & So. Airlines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103,
111 (1948). The Court refused to review the grant to one airline and
the refusal to another of a certificate to engage in overseas air trans-
portation, even though the statute provided for review of "any order...
except any order in respect of any foreign air carrier .... ." Id. at 115
n.2. Both carriers were domestic. The Court was unanimous that what
stemmed from the President was unreviewable, but four Justices thought
that what stemmed from the Board was reviewable. That the case
involved foreign relations, some aspects of which called for secrecy, led
the unanimous Justices to the conclusion that the President's action was
unsuitable for review, even though the statute did not preclude review
but required review. In whatever capacity the President acts, he is an
"agency" as the term is defined in § 2 (a) of the APA. See note 23 infra.
In this instance, he was acting as an administrative officer pursuant to
power delegated by Congress and he was determining the rights of the
private corporations.
22. Berger, Reply 813. In the only 1967 case on the subject that
has come to my attention, the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia, declining to enjoin the Secretary of Defense from sending the plain-
tiff to Vietnam, declared:
It is difficult to think of an area less suited for judicial action
than that into which appellant would have us intrude. The
fundamental division of authority and power established by the
Constitution precludes judges from overseeing the conduct of
foreign policy or the use and disposition of military power...
Luftig v. McNamara, Feb. 6, 1967.
23. Section 2(a) of the APA defines "agency" as "each authority
... of the Government of the United States other than Congress, the
courts, or the governments of the possessions, Territories, or the District
of Columbia." APA § 2 (a). That clearly includes the President.
24. The Act excepts "military or naval authority exercised in the
field in time of war. .. ." APA § 2(a). But the lack of a declaration
of war apparently means that we are not technically at war in Vietnam.
25. Conceivably, a court might step in if the executive action were
sufficiently outrageous. But courts will ordinarily refuse to examine
the denial of a pardon, and that is enough to reject Berger's "always."
26. The Supreme Court refuses to review such recognition decisions.
National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 358 (1955); United
States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942).
27. 72 Stat. 1115 (1958), 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1966). The provision
goes back at least as far as 48 Stat. 9 (1933).
28. See the holding, as well as the collection of authorities, in Bare-
field v. Byrd, 320 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 928
(1964).
29. See the discussion of various such statutes and the case law
under them in §§ 28.09, .13, .14, .15 of my Administrative Law Treatise




30. One of the strangest positions Mr. Berger takes is that a court's
denial of review on the ground that a statute precludes review is not
an authority against his position that arbitrariness or abuse is always
reviewable. See Berger, Sequel 622-23. Following his reasoning is diffi-
cult for me, but I gather that he thinks he can confine his discussion to
the second exception to § 10, so that anything governed by the first
-exception can be excluded from his discussion. The two exceptions are:
"Except so far as (1) statutes preclude . . . review or (2) agency action
Is: by law committed to agency discretion." APA § 10.
-. My opinion is that the two exceptions clearly overlap. Whenever
a statute cuts off review of a discretionary determination, I think the
statute precludes review and the agency action is by law committed to
agency discretion.
The two main reasons the courts give for unreviewability are con-
gressional intent and judicial belief in unsuitability of judicial review.
Some decisions for unreviewability rely on one of these reasons, some on
the other, and some on both. All opinions that rest on both can be classi-
fied as within both exceptions in the introductory clause to § 10. But
nothing of substance hinges on the classification, I think, except that
convenience of discussion is sometimes aided by such classification. The
important points are that the overlap is clear and that much arbitrariness
or abuse is held unreviewable.
-- 31. -Berger, Sequel 603-04.
32. The presumption idea was first advanced in my article, Unre-
-viewable Administrative Action, 15 F.R.D. 411, 426 (1954), and later car-
ried into § 28.07 of- my Treatise. When the first of Mr. Berger's four ar-
ticles appeared, I asked him why he ignored my §, 28.21. By letter of
March 2, 1965, he said that that section he had "inadvertently missed,
much- to my xegret." In his three later -articles he has never mentioned
either his inadvertence or his regret.
33. Berger's idea that a case allowing review under the APA is con-
trary to my position pervades half or more of his analysis of case law.
This error appears perhaps a dozen times. A good example is his dis-
cussion of the Vucinic case at 626-27. The court quoted from my §
28.16 and then said:
-Howev'er, I am unable to conclude that the decision ... is "coui-
°mitted to .... disc.retion" in the sense, to apply Davis's analysis
of, making his ... order unreviewable--even for arbitrariness
Berger"-seems to me clearly wrong when he says: "Far from being an
.adoption': of. Davis' 'solution,' Vucinic constitutes a tacit rejection." The
-court .applied my analysis.in order to reach its decision and I am in
-agreement not only with'the c6urt's adoption of -that analysis but with
the way the -court applied it. • :
Related to what has just been said is another of Berger's pervasive
.-nisunderstandings. Most of the many pages he devotes to discussing the
Gidney case revolve around his belief that' I cannot. disagree with a
-decision" whib/i adopts my affalysis. For instance, he -says at page 637:
"Let us put to one side his graceless dismissal as 'wrong' of a decision
which -was framed in reliance on the" 'solution' he proposed in his
:Treatise.' -Here -and -elsewhere; he fails to see 'that a decision about
reviewability involves a two-step process: The court first interprets the
-APA -to mean that reviewability- depends on -the question whether the
-action is "committed" to -agency discretion; as to this step the case law
is uniform. The second step is to decide whether the particular action




terpretation of the APA; I have never agreed with its initial decision
that the licensing of a bank was so "committed." Berger's six or seven
pages on Gidney rest on his false statement that I cited the case with
approval. He now refuses to acknowledge his error. Berger, Sequel
636. He should realize that any reader can see for himself that I did not
cite the case with approval. See § 28.06 of my 1963 pocket parts.
34. Berger's misquotations were undoubtedly inadvertent in the
first instance. But I leave to the reader the explanation for two further
facts: (1) He has refused to correct them after they have been pointed
out to him; (2) Correcting them would destroy the basis for much of
his argument.
I have called his attention to more than a dozen misquotations. I
shall here limit myself to three typical examples.
The neatest example is probably the Berger passage at page 620 in
which he makes me look hilariously inconsistent. He says, quoting me
four times:
This "probable intent" was speedily transmuted into a "clear
expression of Congress in favor of preventing review"; this was
what Congress "so clearly said." Happily, he has since beat a
retreat. Now he does "not say that the statutory words require[his] interpretation."
Of the four quotations from me, the first and fourth are about the com-
bination of the "except" clause with the "abuse of discretion" phrase,
and the second and third are about the "except" clause taken alone: I
have consistently said that the combination cannot be read literally, and
I have consistently said that the "except" clause alone or in any com-
bination other than with the "abuse of discretion" phrase is and should
be read literally. My discussion of the "except" clause appears in the
first paragraph of § 28.16 of my Treatise. My discussion of the combina-
tion with the "abuse of discretion" phrase appears in the second para-
graph of that section. Both those paragraphs were first published in a
1948 article, before any case law existed on the subject. The unanimous
case law now supports both paragraphs. Why should I "beat a retreat"
from such a position?
At 610-11 he quotes me twice. The second quotation is said to
"prove by the Professor's own words" that the first quotation "is utterly
misleading." The point of the first quotation of three sentences is that
the courts uniformly read the "except" clause literally. The point of
the second quotation of two sentences is that the literal language makes
no sense, but Berger does not say what language. By saying that the
second quotation proves that the first is "utterly misleading," he clearly
implies that both quotations are about the same subject. . But the first
one was about the "except" clause alone, and the second was about that
clause in combination with the "abuse of discretion" phrase. I have
consistently said that the "except" clause is and should be interpreted
literally, and that the combination is not and cannot be interpreted
literally.
Berger has refused my request that he tell his readers that the second
quotation from me is not on the same subject as the first quotati6n. Of
course, disclosing that would destroy his point that he can "prove by the
Professor's own words" that the first quotation "is utterly misleading,"
and that point is the foundation for a whole section of his argument.
At page 627 Berger says:
"[T]he 'literal language' of the second exception, read against
section 10(e), Professor Davis said, 'makes neither grammatical




The statement of mine to which Berger refers was not about 10 (e) but
was expressly stated to be about "one clause of subsection (e)." That
one clause was that the "court shall . . . set aside agency action ...
found to be ... an abuse of discretion .... ." The statement Berger
imputes to me would be false about any part of 10(e) except that one
clause. But Berger refuses to make correction. Making correction would
destroy his argument.
35. JAFFz, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADmINISTRATIVE ACTION 359-60
(1965).
36. Jaffe shows throughout his discussion of reviewability that he
does not share Berger's erroneous idea that discretion can be unreview-
able at the same time that abuse of discretion is reviewable. See the
last paragraph of my text supra at 647.
37. JAFra, op. cit. supra note 35, at 360.
38. Id. at 363.
39. Jaffe quite properly says that "the mere presence of agency
discretion does not oust review." Id. at 374. I agree; after all, the books
are full of review of discretion. But on the next page he suffers a slight
lapse when he says that "the presence of discretion should not bar a
court from considering a claim of illegal or arbitrary use of discretion."
Id. at 375. He should have put in the word "mere," as he had just done
on the preceding page. Presence of discretion bars a court from review-
ing whenever the action is deemed "committed" to agency discretion,
and on this the courts are unanimous.
40. Berger, at page 639, calls my discussion of the Walter-Logan
bill "a purely denigratory tactic." I did not so intend it. What he ob-jects to is my statement that he advocates "essentially" the Walter-Logan
view. He now confirms that this is so at -the very time that he is denying
it. With respect to awarding contracts and rejecting supplies, courts
could not review before Walter-Logan, but that bill provided they could,
as the Attorney General said. And now Berger asserts, at page 640,
that the APA "can hardly be read to exhibit an intention to insulate
arbitrariness in the exercise of those functions." The view Berger now
asserts about awarding contracts and rejecting supplies is not merely
"essentially" the same as Walter-Logan; it is precisely the same. (Ber-
ger's long discussion of scope of review in Walter-Logan seems to me
irrelevant to a discussion of reviewability.)
Berger says at page 640 that I take Jaffe to task "for nonmention of
the view that prosecutorial 'abuse of discretion' is reviewable." He goes
on to say at 641 that "One can only marvel at Professor Davis' chameleon-
like capacity to tailor his views to the occasion." My view has been the
same on all occasions: A prosecutor's discretion is ordinarily unreview-
able for abuse, but in the special context of the Moog case (where one
competitor is caught between the FTC and his competitors) the Seventh
Circuit has reviewed and the case is now before the Supreme Court.
Berger is clearly mistaken in giving the impression that a prosecutor's
discretion is ordinarily reviewable for abuse; it is not, whichever way
the Supreme Court holds in the pending case.
41. Berger, Sequel 609.
42. Id. at 639.
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